SIGAA - Sistema Integrado de Gestão de Atividades Acadêmicas

Resumo do Componente Curricular

Dados Gerais do Componente Curricular
Tipo do Componente Curricular:	DISCIPLINA
Unidade Responsável:	PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM ADMINISTRAÇÃO - PPGA (16.21)
Código:	PGA4081
Nome:	TEA II - CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Carga Horária Teórica:	30 h.
Carga Horária Prática:	0 h.
Carga Horária Total:	30 h.
Pré-Requisitos:
Co-Requisitos:
Equivalências:
Excluir da Avaliação Institucional:	Não
Matriculável On-Line:	Sim
Horário Flexível da Turma:	Não
Horário Flexível do Docente:	Sim
Obrigatoriedade de Nota Final:	Sim
Pode Criar Turma Sem Solicitação:	Não
Necessita de Orientador:	Não
Exige Horário:	Sim
Permite CH Compartilhada:	Não
Permite Múltiplas Aprovações:	Sim
Quantidade Máxima de Matrículas:	1
Quantidade de Avaliações:	1
Ementa/Descrição:	Course description In this course we will explore some issues in corporate governance, discussing both theoretical and empirical implications drawn from topics such as: agency theory, conflicts of interest, executive compensation, board of directors, investor protection, laws and enforcement and practices in developed and emerging markets. Paper presentations Each student will be asked to present papers in class sessions. Sessions begin with a paper presentation, followed by discussion with all attendants. Every student must study the assigned reading prior to the class session. If you only apply skimming to speed your reading, you’ll not be prepared for class discussion. In class, I expect the presenter to be asked by the other students about their thoughts on the subject. Grading Final grade will consist of two factors: Paper presentations 70% Attendance and participation 30%
Referências:	Almeida, Heitor V., e Daniel Wolfenzon. 2006. “A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family Business Groups”. The Journal of Finance 61 (6): 2637–80. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01001.x. Arena, Matteo P., e Marcus V. Braga-Alves. 2013. “The discretionary effect of CEOs and board chairs on corporate governance structures”. Journal of Empirical Finance 21 (março): 121–31. doi:10.1016/j.jempfin.2013.01.002. Bebchuk, Lucian, Alma Cohen, e Allen Ferrell. 2009. “What Matters in Corporate Governance?” Review of Financial Studies 22 (2): 783–827. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn099. Berg, S., e S. Smith. 1978. “CEO and board chairman: a quantitative study of dual vs. unitary board leadership”. Directors and Boards 3: 34–39. Bigelli, Marco. 2004. “Dual Class Stock Unifications and Shareholders’ Expropriation”. SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 506602. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=506602. Black, Bernard S., Antonio Gledson de Carvalho, e Joelson Oliveira Sampaio. 2014. “The evolution of corporate governance in Brazil”. Emerging Markets Review 20 (setembro): 176–95. doi:10.1016/j.ememar.2014.04.004. Black, Bernard S., Inessa Love, e Andrei Rachinsky. 2006. “Corporate governance indices and firms’ market values: Time series evidence from Russia”. Emerging Markets Review, Financial market development in the Central and Eastern European countries, 7 (4): 361–79. doi:10.1016/j.ememar.2006.09.004. Bliss, Mark A., Ferdinand A. Gul, e Abdul Majid. 2011. “Do political connections affect the role of independent audit committees and CEO Duality? Some evidence from Malaysian audit pricing”. Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics 7 (2): 82–98. doi:10.1016/j.jcae.2011.10.002. Brickley, James A., Jeffrey L. Coles, e Gregg Jarrell. 1997. “Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board”. Journal of Corporate Finance 3 (3): 189–220. doi:10.1016/S0929-1199(96)00013-2. Chong, Alberto, e Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes. 2006. “Corporate Governance and Firm Value in Mexico”. Research Department Publications 4466. Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. https://ideas.repec.org/p/idb/wpaper/4466.html. Copeland, Thomas E., J. Fred Weston, e Kuldeep Shastri. 2004. Financial Theory and Corporate Policy. 4 edition. Boston, MA: Pearson. Dey, Aiyesha, Ellen Engel, e Xiaohui Liu. 2011. “CEO and board chair roles: To split or not to split?” Journal of Corporate Finance 17 (5): 1595–1618. doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.09.001. Donaldson, Lex, e James H. Davis. 1991. “Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns”. Australian Journal of Management 16 (1): 49–64. doi:10.1177/031289629101600103. Fuller, Joseph, e Michael C. Jensen. 2002. “Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a Stop to the Earnings Game”. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 14 (4): 41–46. doi:10.1111/j.1745-6622.2002.tb00447.x. Guillet, Basak Denizci, Kwanglim Seo, Deniz Kucukusta, e Seoki Lee. 2013. “CEO duality and firm performance in the U.S. restaurant industry: Moderating role of restaurant type”. International Journal of Hospitality Management 33 (junho): 339–46. doi:10.1016/j.ijhm.2012.10.004. Gul, Ferdinand A., e Sidney Leung. 2004. “Board leadership, outside directors’ expertise and voluntary corporate disclosures”. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 23 (5): 351–79. doi:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2004.07.001. Henry, Darren. 2004. “Corporate governance and ownership structure of target companies and the outcome of takeovers”. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 12 (4): 419–44. doi:10.1016/j.pacfin.2003.09.004. Hermalin, Benjamin E., e Michael S. Weisbach. 2003. “Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature”. Economic Policy Review, no Apr: 7–26. Jensen, Michael C., e William H. Meckling. 1976. “Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure”. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4): 305–60. doi:10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X. Jensen, Michael C., Kevin J. Murphy, e Eric G. Wruck. 2004. “Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got to Here, What are the Problems, and How to Fix Them”. SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 561305. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=561305. Kamarudin, Khairul Anuar, Wan Adibah Wan Ismail, e Mas Ervina Samsuddin. 2012. “The Influence of CEO Duality on the Relationship between Audit Committee Independence and Earnings Quality”. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, International Congress on Interdisciplinary Business and Social Sciences 2012 (ICIBSoS 2012), 65 (dezembro): 919–24. doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2012.11.220. Kim, Kong-Hee, Hussam A. Al-Shammari, Bongjin Kim, e Seung-Hyun Lee. 2009. “CEO duality leadership and corporate diversification behavior”. Journal of Business Research 62 (11): 1173–80. doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2008.10.017. Klapper, Leora F., e Inessa Love. 2004. “Corporate governance, investor protection, and performance in emerging markets”. Journal of Corporate Finance 10 (5): 703–28. doi:10.1016/S0929-1199(03)00046-4. La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, e Robert Vishny. 2000. “Investor protection and corporate governance”. Journal of Financial Economics, Special Issue on International Corporate Governance, 58 (1–2): 3–27. doi:10.1016/S0304-405X(00)00065-9. Lee, Inmoo, Michael Lemmon, Yan Li, e John M. Sequeira. 2014. “Do voluntary corporate restrictions on insider trading eliminate informed insider trading?” Journal of Corporate Finance 29: 158–78. doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.07.005. Lopez de Silanes, Florencio. 2003. “A Survey of Securities Laws and Enforcement”. 35708. The World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/188821468324886075/A-survey-of-securities-laws-and-enforcement. Morck, Randall. 2008. “Behavioral Finance in Corporate Governance: Economics and Ethics of the Devil’s Advocate”. Journal of Management & Governance 12 (2): 179–200. doi:10.1007/s10997-008-9059-4. OCDE, Organização para Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Econômico. 2004. OECD principles of corporate governance. OCDE. Rechner, Paula L., e Dan R. Dalton. 1991. “CEO Duality and Organizational Performance: A Longitudinal Analysis”. Strategic Management Journal 12 (2): 155–60. doi:10.1002/smj.4250120206. Shleifer, Andrei, e Robert W. Vishny. 1997. “A Survey of Corporate Governance”. The Journal of Finance 52 (2): 737–83. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x. Silva, André Luiz Carvalhal da, e Ricardo Pereira Câmara Leal. 2005. “Corporate Governance Index, Firm Valuation and Performance in Brazil”. Brazilian Review of Finance 3 (1): 1–18. Tirole, Jean. 2006. The Theory of Corporate Finance. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Wang, Tracy Yue, Andrew Winton, e Xiaoyun Yu. 2010. “Corporate Fraud and Business Conditions: Evidence from IPOs”. The Journal of Finance 65 (6): 2255–92. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01615.x. Yang, Tina, e Shan Zhao. 2014. “CEO duality and firm performance: Evidence from an exogenous shock to the competitive environment”. Journal of Banking & Finance 49 (dezembro): 534–52. doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.04.008. Zingales, Luigi. 2007. “Is the U.S. Capital Market Losing its Competitive Edge?” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1028701. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1028701.

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